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RHETORIC AND 
REALITY IN 
KAMPUCHEA
Reviewed by
Darryl Bullen
RED BROTHERHOOD AT  
WAR: Indochina since the 
Fall of Saigon, by Grant 
Evans & Kelvin Rowley. 
Pluto Press, 1985. $14.95,
The laziness or incompetence of journalists relying upon "briefings" from the Thai military or "sources" in the US 
government has resulted in an almost 
continuous stream of blatantly anti- 
Vietnamese propaganda in the 
Western press since 1975. R*d 
Brotnerhoud al War, by Australian 
authors Granl Evans and Kelvin 
Rowley, Io o k s  instead at the facts 
behind the continuing conflicts in 
South East Asia and provides a 
counter to the unsubstantiated 
assertions of Vietnamese expansion­
ism and puppet governments in Laos 
and Kampuchea.
The book, released in early 1985 
and launched m Australia by Foreign 
Minister Bill Hayden, is timely as this 
year marks the tenth anniversary of 
the US defeat in Indochina.
The victories #on in 1975, 
following years of bitter struggle arid 
ending over a century of foreign 
domination, sadly turned sour very 
shortly after the end of the war. The 
"fraternal people" of the new 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK), led by 
the now notorious Pol Pot. began 
deliberate armed aggression against 
Viet Nam, culminating in the 
V ie tn a m e s e  a rm y  e n te r in g  
Kampuchea in December 1978 The 
relations between Viet Nam and 
China gradually deteriorated to the 
point where Cnina invaded Viet Nam 
from the north without provocation in 
early 1979 to "teach Viet Nam a 
lesson", as a result ol the Vietnamese 
action against Pol Pol's government 
in Kampuchea. Socialist countries
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solidarity. (This tactic of inciting 
racism was also used by Pol Pot's 
predecessor, the rightwing military 
dictator Lon Nol.)
Evans and Rowley carefully 
document the events in the 
Kampuchea-Viet Nam conflict from 
May 1975 onwards. The brutal 
attacks on border towns in Viet Nâ i 
by DK forces were followed by 
continued Kampuchean belligerence 
at the negotiating table.
In 1977-78, DK forces inflicted 
immense damage in Viet Nam, 
destroying 25 towns, 96 villages and 
making over 250,000 people 
homeless Then, when dissident 
Khmers (tens of thousands of 
Khmers had been executed ordiedol 
hunger under the DK regime), along 
with Vietnamese forces, overthrew ■ 
the Pol Pot government in January 
1979. Pol Pot announced that this 
justified his propaganda that Viet 
Nam had always wanted to take over 
Kampuchea.
This is an argument taken up ndl 
only by Pol Pot and his partners Son 
Sann and Sinanouk in the so-calleu 
coalition government ol Democratic 
Kampuchea, but also by China and a 
number of governments in the west,( 
notably the USA and the ASEAN 
countries. Evans and Rowley 
carefully dissect the myth of post-wai 
Vietnam ese expansionism and 
present valuable evidence of how Viei * 
Nam worked strenuously after 1975 
to establish firm economic and 
political links with the west. Viet Nap 
was continually rebuffed.
The question ol the current level of 
Vietnamese involvement in the day- 
to-day a ffa irs  of Laos and 
Kampuchea is an important one. Tha 
popular western notion of auisling or 
puppet governments in Vientiane and 
Phnom Penh, answerable only to the 
Hanoi leadership, is not accepted by 
the authors. They agree that Vie* Naif 
is by far the stronger partner in an
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in the Asian region, presumably 
working from a similar ideological 
framework, were in conflict, leaving 
the left confused and an opening for 
the right to exploit.
Evans and Rowley believe that "a major stumbling block to an understanding of events in Indoch'na is the influence ol nationalism". They argue that 
modern nationalism, a product of 
colonialist notions being imposed 
upon traditional societies, is an 
overriding factor ip both communist 
and non-communist states. Tney 
could alsoargue, but for some reason 
don't, that Pol Pot's leadership of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK) and Democratic Kamnuchea 
seems r.ot to have been inspired Dy 
any conventional marxist thought.
Certainly, Pol Pot's deliberate ose 
of anti-Vietname&e racism was in no 
spirit of socialist international
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important alliance but it has. on the 
other hand, generously extended its 
own limited resources to help Lao 
ana Kampuchean reconstruction. 
The "Indochina Federation", so often 
referred to by Pol Pot as evidence of 
Vietnamese designs for "swallowing 
up" Laos and Kampuchea, does not 
exist and has not existed as a viaole 
notion for some thirty years now
C hina's role in the Indochina conflict is vitally important, particularly to the future of 
Kampuchea. China has been arming 
and funding Pol Pot'DK activities 
from the Thai Dorder since 1979 
Evans and Rowley leave no doubt 
that China has a lot to answer for in 
the area of foreign policy. Chinese 
intransigence has been significant in 
blocking a peaceful solution to the 
Kam puchea s itu a tio n . S in ce  
publication of Red Brotherhood, this 
has amounted, in one instance, to 
Chinese o ffic ia ls  preventing 
Sihanouk meeting in Paris with a 
representative of the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea, the current 
effective government of Kampuchea. 
China's premeditated and unprov­
oked attacks on the north of Viet Nam 
in 1979 were an unmitigated failure 
for China, and Evans and Rowley 
poim out that Chinese policy towards 
Indochina has been conter- 
productive.
Similarly, the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
failed to present a successful 
policy for peace and stability in the 
region. Thailand, the ASEAN partner 
closest geographically to Kam­
puchea, has as detailed in the book, 
been crucial in effecting the policies 
of China and the USA. It provides the 
practical means of supplying arms to 
the Pol Pot/DK group. Having 
supported the DK in order to force 
Viet Nam out of Kampuchea, ASEAN 
was "saddled with the task of 
sustaining OK as a credible 
alternative government to the PRK". 
The authors go on to note that 
"whereas the ASEAN countries, 
Thailand above all, genuinely wanted 
lo see the Vietnamese withdraw from 
Kampuchea, the Chinese preferred to 
see them bogged down in a 
protracted war" (in Kampuchea). As 
with the chapter on China, the reader 
is left with the conclusion that 
ASEAN policy towards Indochina has 
also been counter-productive, 
although at least one partner, 
Indonesia, has been working hard on
improving relations with Hanoi.
Finally, conclude Evans and Rowley, the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea have yet to achieve peace. The 
authors believe big power politics 
holds the key to a solution for the 
problems in the region and 
optimistically put forward a view mat 
China is unlikely to directly attack 
Viet Nam while it (China) is seeking to 
normalise relations with the Soviet 
Union.
Rea Brotherhood at War is an 
extremely important and welt- 
documented contribution towards 
understanding the real issues benind 
the conflict in South East Asia.
The book takes on the perplexing 
problem of why it is socialist 
countries have been at war ana 
closely examines some of the 
mistaken views which have clouded 
the thinking of the left in this area. 
The authors seriously challenge 
whether or not international co­
operation between communist 
governments is even possible, given 
the o ve rr id in g  in f lu e n ce  of 
nationalism in individual states. In 
tnis respect, Red Brotherhood is 
essential reading, not only for 
accurate information on the Sojth 
East Asian conflicts, but also for the 
continuing debate on East-West and 
Socialist Community relations.
Evans nnd Rowley write in a style 
which is easily readable and their 
book should be read by all concerned 
about, or involved in, the future of the 
peoples of Indochina.
Darryl Bullen currently works for 
an Australian aid agency. He 
worked with the Australian Red 
Cross in the Thai border relief 
operation in 1979-80 and in 
April/May f 984 visited Viet Nam 
and Kampuchea.
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The colour rea of the left was the reu of embarrassment as the facts of "Democratic Kampu­
chea" (DK) under Poi Pot fiom 1975 
to 19^9 were revealed with increasing 
cred ib ility . M ichael V ickery 's  
Cambodia 1975-1982 recalls how 
sceptical western marxists. properly 
suspicious of the capitalist media, 
initially dismissed the mass media s 
portrayal of DK as a "chamber of 
horrors" as being typical anti­
communist words of hate from the 
mouth of ignorance. Even the more 
critical marxists tended to rationalise 
Pol Pot's regime as a "popular, if 
violent, peasant revolution which was 
possibly doing the right things in 
other than the best way" ano where 
large death tolls were probably 
unavoidable in a country ruined by 
five years of vicious US war from 1970 
to 1975.
When socialist Viet Nam, however, 
revealed the reality of Pol Pot’s terror, 
a sobered left admitted the worst — 
that Pol Pot's policies were mostly to 
blame — and supported the 
Vietnamese-backed popular uprising 
against Pol Pot in 1979.
V,  ickery, an Australian scholar y  fluent in the Khmer language of Kampuchea, visited that 
country often from ihe 'sixties to the 
'eighties. His book presents a picture 
of Kampuchean society built, brick 
by factual brick, from a vast and 
varied range of personal interviews 
conducted by Vickerv with refugees 
and other individuals
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Whereas the "refugee rumour mill" 
was worked uncritically by western 
journalists to present a distorted, 
often false, image of both Pol Pot's 
Kampuchea and the current Heng 
Samrtn government, Vickery subjects 
the refugees' stories to "close 
reading", untangling the propaganda 
from the factual content.
He rigorously tries to cross-check 
and verify the refugees' accounts, 
rather than simply accept them at 
face value. A sensitivity to the bias of 
refugees also demands care in 
evaluating their claims. Many of the 
post-79 refugees favoured by the 
mass media are the better-off "who 
refuse to live with socialism" rather 
than the poor peasants, of whom 
there are fewer and who, after 
experiencing life in Thailand's camps 
unaer the control of an emboldened 
US-back Pol Pot, often return to 
Kam puchea A lso se lec tive ly  
favoured by tne capitalist media were 
those post-75 refugees of the urban 
middle class. Although this class was 
a special object of attack by Pol Pot. 
the media fed on the propaganda 
''news" value of the refugee section 
of this class, who were ''spoiled, 
pretentious, contentious, status- 
conscious at worst, or at ^est simply 
soft, intriguing, addicted to city 
comforts and despising peasant life".
Vickery's analysis of refugee 
testimony shows that there was much 
variation in time, place and extent 
concerning the deaths, the atrocities, 
the rigid egalitarianism of communal 
eating and sleeping, the strict sexual 
code, the destruction of education, 
currency, industry, culture and 
religion, the persecution of doctors 
and other Intellectuals, the forced 
rural collectivisation, etc. There was a 
large element of journalistic beat-up 
for anti-socialist propaganda.
Nevertheless, there were many 
genuine horror stories; terror and a 
climate of fear did exist; and, 
although the death toll (excess, 
"policy" deaths beyond those that 
were the "inevitable results" of the 
US war legacy) of 400,000 was a lot 
less than the 2-3 million alleged by 
the anti-Kampuchea propagandists, 
Vickery rightly stresses that 400,000 
m urdered people is 400,000 
murdered people and this further 
condemns the Pol Pot regime. The 
general failure of the DK regime is 
both evident and huge.
Reviews
C ontrary to the gleeful claims of the enemies of socialism, however, the failure of DK 
was not the failure of marxism. 
Although the Pol Pot regime called 
itself communist, its acuons are no 
judgment on tnat ideology, just as 
Thailand. South Korea and many 
C entra l and Latin  Am erican 
dictatorships calling themselves 
"democratic" doesn't make them so. 
In Eastern Europe, too. the "people's 
democracies" aren't The "affective 
value of labels such as "comm­
unist" and "dem ocratic", says 
Vickery, has little "analytic value" for 
assessing the substance of such 
societies.
DK's failure lay, rather, "in the very 
essence of a peasant revolution". Pol 
Dot's policy was guided by a 
"romantic peasantism", an ideology 
involving excesses of town-hatred 
arbitrary justice and sudden, violent 
death Dorn out of the economic and 
social frustration of the 90 percent 
rural population of Cambodia. This 
laeoiogy existed long before Pol Pot 
based his policies on it to achieve a 
class-free society by social levelling, 
by reducing everyone to the poorest 
of "poor-peasant level", by attacking 
and dismantling the middle class, 
secondary industry, the proletariat, 
economic diversification, etc.
Vickery contrasts this approach 
(based on ' poor-peasant utopian 
ideology rather than marxism- 
leninism” ) with the success of other 
revolutions in largely peasant- 
dominated countries, in Yugoslavia, 
Viet Nam, the USSR (before Stalin 
Pol-Potted that revolution) the 
contradictions of country/town, 
ag ricu ltu re/ ind ustry , peasant 
class/middle class etc. were handled 
by a marxist leadership with policies 
that were "humane, pragmatic and 
unoppressive". These communists 
"argued and practised unity to 
control their revolution". The Pol Pot 
faction within the Kampuchean party 
had eliminated the majority faction of 
pro-Viet Nam communists and leftist 
intellectuals within that party who 
would have followed such successful 
models.
The mass of personal detail (the refugee stories, the factional cavortings in the party, etc.) can overwhelm the casual reader but 
does amply demonstrate the solid 
basis of Vickery's sympathetic but
critical and rigorous analysis ~~ a 1 
quality politically incompatible with i| 
the plastic superficialities of H 
mainstream journalism and soggy I  
liberal scholarship.
As Vickery's study of Kampuchea j  
under the current Heng Samrin 1 
government shows, a clear and ■ 
honest view of Kampuchea is more I  
vital than ever because the US now 
finds Pol Pot good for more anti­
communist ends. US policy-makers | 
and their media toadies are wasmng 
Pol Pot's hands clean and rewriting 
DK's history with the aim of further 
b lacken ing  and iso lating an 1 
independent socialist Viet Nam for its j  
“ invasion" and "occupation" ol 
Kampuchea. Having only recently 
identified Pol Pot with Hitler is no 
obstacle to the US Establishment in 
revising Pol Pot's history — having 
out-Orwelled Orwell's conceptions I 
of rewriting history (from the days j 
when leading Nazis were sanitised I 
and made acceptable by the US 
because a reactionary capitalist 
Germany would prove useful against 
a European socialism and the USSR], 
Pol Pot poses no problems. If even 
Hitler has his uses for the US ....
The US' transforming of Pol Pol 
from communist enemy to anti­
communist friend demonstrates that 
capitalism's love of failed revolutions 
(Pol Pot's DK) is outmatched only oy 
its fear of successful revolutions (Viel 
Nam).
Phil Shannon is a member of the 
Communist Parly of Australia and 
is currently a public servant in 
Canberra.
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